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A US GOVERNMENT INTERAGENCY STRUCTURE TO COMBAT TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM

Terrorists viciously attacked the United States on 11 September 2001 killing thousands of
Americans and several hundred foreign workers in near-simultaneous attacks on the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon. Another forty Americans died in Pennsylvania when they took action against the terrorists aboard United Airlines Flight 93 that was destined for an unknown target that would have caused even more deaths. Nineteen terrorists supported by an unknown number of cells secretively planned and executed these attacks for several months, maybe even years, and caught the United States government, the intelligence community, law enforcement agencies and the American people by complete surprise. Acts of terrorism are not new. Over the past twenty years they have been growing in frequency and audacity, but these attacks have clearly awakened the American people, convincing them that the United States' most critical national interest -the welfare of its citizens and its homeland -is threatened by this cunning and vicious foe.
Since these events, the Bush administration has reacted quickly to the crisis, garnering international cooperation and making initial headway in defeating Usama Bin Laden's network of Al Qaeda terrorists. However, President Bush has said on numerous occasions that this is not going to be a short war on terrorism. As much as initial actions have made significant progress in disrupting Bin Laden's network to date, the President must organize the United States for a sustained war on international terrorism. The US must attack the terrorist networks where they live, while protecting the American homeland from terrorists ready to attack from within its borders. Fighting terrorism is a complex matter. It is not a fight that can be delegated to one agency of the United States government and be reasonably assured of success. It is a fight that will require the focused efforts of numerous federal agencies to defeat this current threat.'
Our current national security structure based on the National Security Act of 1947 was enacted for the purpose of coordinating national security strategy to defeat the nuclear threat the Soviet Union posed during the Cold War. It is a system that has expanded to handle a variety of broad and highly complex national security issues. Nonetheless, the world has changed dramatically and the US national security structure has not kept pace to deal with the emerging threats to our security. Clearly the recent attacks demonstrate the need to reexamine how our national security system is structured relative to this new threat and make needed changes to prevent more Americans from perishing at the terrorists' hands. There is no one right answer that guarantees the prevention of any more terrorists attacks on the US but we must act to eliminate deficiencies when they are discovered. The purpose of this paper is to examine the current situation terrorism presents, assess our current preparedness to deal with this problem and recommend organizational interagency structural changes required to sustain a prolonged war to defeat international terrorism.
THE ENVIRONMENT -TERRORISM
To find solutions to the problem, we have to define the terrorist threat and its components. The following questions must be asked and answered. What is the nature of the terrorist threat against the United States? How have modern terrorists adapted in this changed world? How are these changes different in practice -the introduction of networks and netwar?
These questions must be addressed before our national security systems can reorganize to defeat them.
WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE TERRORIST THREAT AGAINST THE UNITED STATES?
Terrorism is "the process of using terror, violence, and intimidation to achieve an end. Arquilla and Ronfeldt, network-centric advocates working for RAND, define netwar as an: "emerging mode of conflict (and crime) at societal levels, involving measures short of war, in which the protagonists use -indeed, depend on using -network forms of organization, doctrine, strategy, and communication. These protagonists generally consist of dispersed, often small groups who agree to communicate, coordinate and act in an internetted manner, often without a precise central leadership or headquarters... It differs from traditional modes of conflict and crime in which the protagonists prefer to use hierarchical organizations, doctrines, and strategies as in the past efforts to foster large, centralized mass movements."8
The revolution of technology in the information age has enabled this new form of warfare to develop. Arquilla and Ronfeldt further describe how networked organizations remain widely dispersed and secretive while seeking targets to act upon. Then, once identified and targeted, the netwarriors attack stealthily from multiple approaches to "swarm" against their target. 9
Terrorists will become further diversified, decentralized and flexible in applying these techniques. They will rely on networks enabled by information age technology and will attempt to exploit weaknesses in US defenses. 1 0 Network cells will remain secure by their dispersion, assimilation into existing societies and virtual invisibility. Gaps created in US defenses such as those areas not covered by law enforcement agencies, the military, or other government agencies create the infiltration lanes and battlespace for these terrorists and those who support their operations. Terrorists will also seek support and assistance from other terrorist groups, failed states or international crime organizations for the resources they need to survive.
Additionally, they will continue to exploit the seams created by the US government's lack of cohesive and integrated policy and structure to detect and arrest or attack these terrorist organizations. What do these shifts in tactics and strategies mean for US national security?
Arquilla and Ronfeldt listed several implications nation states must consider. First, hierarchically structured organizations have a difficult time fighting networked organizations.
Hierarchical ones are too slow to locate and coordinate actions against netwarriors. Second, the authors believe networks must be used to defeat other networks. Adopting the principles of network structures is essential in defeating the terrorists' decentralized, agile capabilities.
Finally, they conclude that the one who masters the network form first and best will gain a major advantage." Our inability to detect and stop the terrorist networks became evident on 11 September. How is the United States government presently structured to handle networked terrorists and how must it adapt itself to defeat these netwarriors? THE CURRENT US NATIONAL SECURITY STRUCTURE AND ISSUES.
CURRENT US STRATEGIC ORGANIZATION.
The United States governmental structure at the strategic level is derived from the 14 Coupled with the state and local agencies that would respond first in subsequent attacks on the US and the numerous agencies required to prevent these attacks from occurring again, the task has proven to be a daunting one. Second, the administration looked at the NSC system for handling national security issues as a template for a brand new Homeland Security Furthermore, the placement of the Counterterrorism and Cybersecurity advisers within the structures further confuses the lines of responsibilities. Hence, at the strategic level, US national security solutions intent on combating terrorist networks begin to breakdown.
Furthermore, the problem is exacerbated by our reliance on traditional bureaucratic and hierarchical systems in our executive branch of government. This structure developed over time and has established a proven track record that helped make the United States the global power it is today. However, this structure requires adaptation to defeat the networked terrorist threat.
BUREAUCRACIES AND HIERARCHICAL ORGANIZATIONS.
Although not ideal for combating new terrorist organizations, bureaucracies and hierarchical organizations are not completely without merit in determining foreign policy or 6 recommending national security decisions. First, bureaucracies entail the division of labor that provides for organizing and assigning tasks. This, in turn, creates experts within those assigned fields. Second, competing organizations with different tasks ensure that different ideas or perspectives are considered in the decision making process (at least theoretically). Third, they provide for clear lines of responsibility and chains of command to govern the execution of tasks.
Fourth, rules and standard operating procedures exist to regulate and govern behavior of large organizations. Fifth, written records document the bureaucracies' activities. Sixth, personnel within these organizations are compensated and promoted allowing the "best and the brightest"
within their fields to rise to the top of the organizational ladder. Finally, with expertise massed in these organizations conditions exist to promote proactive planning -the anticipation of events rather than merely reacting to events that happen. 18 These characteristics describe the "theoretical basis for the view that bureaucracies contribute to the rational decision-making" 19 process. Some of these benefits organizations actually experience in practice as well. But
Kegley and Wittkopf describe the negative side to hierarchical bureaucracies that many organizations including the US government experience day-to-day in the way they deal with each other and how they shape the behavior of the people within their organizations.
They describe organizations that exhibit parochial behavior promoting their self-interests and placing them before national interests. They also describe bureaucracies as competitive organizations vying for resources and decisions that favor their own agenda. These organizations seeking more resources and acting out of self-interest also seek to expand their roles in order to establish their importance and value. Bigger budgets, expanded roles and missions usually translate into larger organizations that wield more power and promote their long-term survival. Bureaucracies develop cultures centered on accomplishing their mission but also preserving their existence and influence. Many of these behaviors manifest themselves in organizational cultures that promote exclusiveness and secrecy, conformity among its members, deference to convention and reliance upon traditional solutions to solve new problems. Consequently, these factors combine to create bureaucratic organizations that, in practice, resist change, compete outright with other governmental organizations, and sometimes, willingly commit "bureaucratic sabotage" of Presidential decisions. 20
Somewhere between the extremes of the theoretical .organizations and those in practice that Kegley and Wittkopf describe is the "ideal" bureaucratic organization that needs to be developed to ensure US security and well-being, both domestically and abroad. Key to organizing the US national security structure for the purpose of protecting itself from future attacks will be to harness the advantages of "theoretical" bureaucratic organizations and minimizing the disadvantages described in "practicing" bureaucratic structures. It will be necessary to restructure the US government's interagency bureaucracy to avoid traditional solutions to combating the new terrorist threat and to ensure coordination and cooperation exists at all levels -from the strategic through the tactical level -to defeat terrorism. The reorganization should take advantage of institutional specialization that has proven its worth and developed a core of seasoned veterans. Further, these new structures must incorporate these experts and combine them with others to solve the new and very complex interagency problems the terrorists pose to US national security. Said another way, "...because their functions are different, military officers, spies, diplomats, and lawyers see problems and their solutions differently. No one of these different approaches is expendable. To succeed, the US government needs them all and needs vigorous advocates for each. The best way to increase interagency coordination will be the one that promotes coordination while respecting these differences and enhancing their forceful expression." 2 '
Fixing the problem requires two major steps. First, clear definitions of roles and responsibilities must be assigned to existing hierarchical organizations to take advantage of their size, procedures and massed expertise. Second, interagency structures must be inserted throughout theses hierarchical organizations to create the interagency networks that will optimize the US government's ability to combat terrorist networks. These interagency networks will have to be established at all levels: strategic, operational and tactical to ensure that strategic objectives and policy are translated into tactical missions executed by operators at the grass roots level.
HOW SHOULD THE US GOVERNMENT ORGANIZE ITSELF FOR THE SUSTAINED FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM? DEFINING FUNCTIONS TO COMBAT TERRORISM
The fight against terrorism is a complex problem involving numerous agencies and departments at the national, state and local levels. It is both a domestic problem and an international one. To protect our national interests requires defense of the homeland and attacking the terrorist threat at its source. The first step in reorganizing the US government to achieve unity of effort is by establishing clear definitions of roles and responsibilities, then assigning them to organizations with "strategic" responsibilities. These organizations would be responsible for coordinating and integrating US strategic policy across multiple organizations to achieve the desired effect and successfully combat terrorism. Joint Doctrine helps us define the crucial functions involved in combating terrorism -the offensive and defensive ones. Operations, in the context of this paper, focus solely on the aspects of attacking and defending information systems and refer exclusively to cyber-security measures, not the full aspects of all information operations. Finally, the President defined Incident Management, one of the responsibilities that require policy and actions in order to respond to terrorist acts that could not be prevented. Again, terrorist incidents will occur within the United States and abroad. These measures, because they span various agencies, require one organization to define policy, devote resources and monitor policy execution. Keeping these four functions in mind, the next step is to assign responsibilities. Table 1 proposes an alignment of responsibilities for functions required to combat terrorism and is further explained below. First and foremost, the President should eliminate the dual structure currently in effect as a result of NSPD-1 and HSPD-1 and require a single organization and system rather than two with shared responsibility, which leaves the President as the arbitrator. Additionally, the President should expand the NSC's role to include homeland security. This will effectively assign all four functions required at the strategic level to conduct the global war on terrorism (GWOT) under one organization. The NSC would be responsible for advising the President on actions or policies to combat terrorism, establish objectives and priorities to meet requirements, and develop a coherent, integrated national security strategy intent on protecting America and eliminating the terrorist threat. The National Security Council and the NSC system are best suited for this responsibility because of the established interagency network and inherent presidential or strategic viewpoint the NSC system takes regarding national security issues. 26 Though it has its shortcomings, the NSC system has proven effective since 1947 with its wellestablished multi-agency connections and reputation for successfully managing national crises.
NSA and NSC Staff -Coordinate/Advise President on Global War on Terrorism (GWOT)
Antiterrorism (AT) Counterterrorism (CT) Incident Management (IM) Information OpsJ
Next, the President should reassign the Homeland Security Adviser, the Cyber-security
Adviser and the Counterterrorism Adviser to the NSC staff. These advisers would be responsible for coordinating, recommending and supervising strategic policy with regard to the functions shown in Table 1 . The HLS adviser would be responsible for policies within the United States. The Counterterrorism adviser would be assigned responsibility for policy external to the US. The Cyber-security adviser would have responsibility for integrating both the domestic and international policies regarding cyber-security aspects of information operations since this area tends to span international borders.
The NSC staff is relatively small and would become ineffective if too large, yet the complexity of integrating policy on each of the four functions would overwhelm the existing structure. Therefore, within these assigned functions, the NSC would rely upon currently configured hierarchical organizations with sufficient staffing and traditional expertise to assist in coordinating, staffing and supervising policy decisions. They would also manage the resources and execute budget integration and supervision for those responsibilities. States' interests abroad for all US personnel and facilities located in numerous countries throughout the world. They would be responsible for measures, traditionally within their area of expertise, to protect US national interests abroad by hardening facilities to protect them from possible terrorist attacks. They would also be responsible for coordinating host-nation support efforts to respond to terrorist incidents that occur to US personnel or facilities countries where there is a US presence. They would establish policies to ensure the safety of US personnel abroad and coordinate with US and foreign intelligence and law enforcement agencies of the host countries to gather intelligence designed to identify and detect threats targeting US interests abroad. Attacking the sources of terrorism abroad would be a Department of Defense (DoD) responsibility. The Defense establishment is ideally structured with the existing Joint Staff and regional combatant commanders (CINCs) to devise strategy and implement policy internationally to identify, detect, seek and destroy or neutralize sources of terrorism, either unilaterally or cooperation with other nations.
As stated earlier, Information Operations would come under the auspices of the Special Advisor to the President for Cyber-security as the lead for coordinating national policy regarding information operations security measures. For support, the Cyber-security adviser would rely on the Justice Department with its expertise in operating the National Infrastructure Protection
Center (NIPC). The NIPC has been established within the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is charged with "developing information resources and working relationships with infrastructure owners and operators and providing a mechanism for information sharing between the public and private sectors. NIPC will develop all necessary assets and capabilities to support operations aimed at disrupting and defeating threats to critical infrastructures." 27 For
Information Operations outside the US, DoD has already assigned SPACECOM responsibility for information operations within the military structure for both defensive and offensive measures. 28 SPACECOM has made significant progress in developing measures to protect information security and has developed the means of attacking threats through this medium.
They are also a supporting command for the regional combatant commands worldwide and can leverage this existing relationship to integrate Information Operations into the established Department of Defense structure. This enhances integration of cyber-security policy and, with additional interagency assistance, should enable it to be broadened to include designing policy and developing measures to protect all governmental systems located overseas.
ESTABLISHING THE INTERAGENCY NETWORK FROM STRATEGIC TO THE TACTICAL LEVELS
Responsibilities for activities would be centrally coordinated and integrated at the NSC level with staff support and expertise from "lead agencies". However, none of these departments can do it all alone and accomplish the strategic goals without interagency support.
Combating terrorism requires a "diplomatic component, a law enforcement component, an intelligence component, a financial component and a military component as well." 29 Networkcentric advocates like Arquilla and Ronfeldt promote the concept that must be applied to the national security structure at all levels in order to eliminate the terrorists' freedom of movement, limit their battlespace and seize the initiative. Netwar advocates recommend using networks to combat networks. Several types can work; however, the most effective is the all-channel network. This type of network exists when all participants of a network or node are connected to each other. Although the most effective, they are also the most difficult to establish and to sustain. 30 They require robust, integrated packages of information-sharing technology to function effectively. They also require heavy investments in human capital. Robust informationsharing technology packages require people to use the equipment and make decisions to use the shared information.
Policy Coordination Committees established by the President's NSPD-1 are interagency structures by their nature and serve as the networked system as the strategic level. However, combining and reorganizing PCCs created.by both national security and homeland security presidential directives will be necessary to achieve further efficiencies. Additionally, interagency operations centers should be established within appropriate executive branch departments to effectively coordinate and close the strategic level gaps within our current "stovepiped" system.
Lastly, establishing interagency networks at the operational and tactical levels will be essential in order for the numerous departments to carry out interagency policy and translate strategic goals and objectives into operational and tactical missions conducted by interagency organizations at the lowest levels.
Applying an all-channel network structure to current forms within our governmental structure will be no easy task. Converting completely to a flat, decentralized and highly responsive structure that Arquilla and Ronfeldt suggest, especially in the midst of fighting the current war on terrorism, could be disastrous. Adding all-channel network structures to augment current hierarchical organizations rather than dismantle them and replace existing structures in the midst of the conflict is the optimal solution. In some cases, all-channel network principles are already being applied within current government organizations below the strategic level. In other cases, augmenting existing organizations can be done with relatively minor difficulty. How might the US apply some of these principles at the operational and tactical levels?
Use of interagency coordination groups and task forces could augment existing structures that will enable the current systems to adopt a networked structure to as part of the counternetwar Arquilla and Ronfeldt describe. 
PROCEDURAL CHANGES REQUIRED
At the strategic level, the National Security Council should develop procedures that dictate how the interagency process should work. 33 Although not a panacea, Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56 that served as the Clinton administration's process for conducting complex contingency operations, could serve as a starting point. Admittedly an imperfect process for conducting interagency operations at the strategic level, it does have its advantages. PDD-56 provided a framework and planning tools under the auspices of an executive committee answerable to the NSC Deputies Committee's supervision. The framework also provided for a fully integrated political-military plan that, in theory, synchronized all elements of national power in complex interagency contingency operations. Additionally, rehearsals, after action reviews and training became standard practices in conducting contingency operations. One report cited the combination of these practices showed a significant improvement in interagency effectiveness. 34 However, it had drawbacks as well.
Not all aspects the framework called for manifested itself in execution. One study identified areas where improvement could be made to enhance the effectiveness of PDD-56.
First, PDD-56 was best suited for the strategic level. When applied below that level it ceased to be effective. Second, it functioned best with a strong leader who championed the process.
Third, the framework needed to provide for more flexibility in the plan to achieve versatility and acceptability. Finally, to be effective PDD-56 required dedicated funding to support training. 3 5 Using this analysis and developing procedures that the agencies can agree upon while leveraging the advantages of PDD-56 and minimizing it drawbacks is useful. It increases the probability that the NSC staff can develop an effective framework to energize and focus interagency planning to synchronize all elements of national power into a coherent, integrated strategy to prosecute the global war on terrorism. Since PDD-56 did not apply well below the strategic level what about the operational and tactical levels?
The Joint Staff has recently developed a generic political-military plan template that lists the key components of an interagency plan for contingency operations. Both PDD-56 and the generic plan focus primarily on humanitarian assistance operations or peacekeeping operations.
However, these plans can easily be applied to operations to combat terrorism since interagency unity of effort is the desired outcome. To complete the development of the standardized interagency doctrine and interoperability procedures, the NSC should task the Department of 
CONCLUSION
This paper analyzed the current status of the interagency system and processes vis-a-vis the current terrorist threat. It identified how new terrorist organizations are different. It described as well how their organizational structures take advantage of traditional US hierarchical structures. Finally, it proposed a potential method of defining the problem and organizing the US governmental structure to respond to this new threat. The proposal recommends organizational concept using networks to combine the traditional strengths of existing departmental expertise within the US government with the advantages of interagency cells to enhance connectivity and coordination. This concept is designed to deal with the interagency complexity of operations we confront as well as sustain the long-term US effort to conduct the global war on terrorism. By no means a perfect or easy solution, it provides a realistic option to consider for organizing the US government's response to international terrorism with the ultimate goal of achieving unity of effort in defeating transnational terrorists that threaten the globe while protecting America's homeland and its citizens.
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